Nearly one in nine Haitians has been displaced by violence, and gangs control 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince. As Haiti moves towards elections scheduled for late 2025, the country faces a volatile year that will shape its political and security trajectory.
The assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021 triggered a governance vacuum and a wider security crisis in Haiti. At the time, the parliament had been dissolved, elections delayed, and no successor named. In the aftermath, Ariel Henry became the de facto prime minister, ruling by decree until April 2024, when the Presidential Transition Council (Conseil Présidentiel de Transition: CPT) was created.
The nine-member CPT now holds executive power until a new president is inaugurated, scheduled for February 2026. Its mandate is narrow – organising elections and maintaining security – yet its legitimacy is contested by the gangs. The first round of presidential elections is set to take place on 15 November 2025.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised a Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) in 2023. Led by Kenya, the MSSM arrived in June 2024 to support the Haitian National Police. It includes personnel from Jamaica, the Bahamas, Belize, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The MSSM’s mandate was extended until 2 October 2025, but its future and funding remain uncertain. Other states, including Colombia, Brazil, France, and Mexico, are providing training to the Police, and France has also supplied equipment. The reliance on a diverse coalition with uneven resources underlines both the urgency of international engagement and the fragility of current security arrangements.
This fragile institutional and security environment has created a space for armed groups to consolidate power.
Since May 2025, according to Janes Events, most gang-related events and operations in the Ouest department have occurred in Kenscoff and Delmas, areas that control important access routes into Port-au-Prince. On 9 August, the CPT declared a three-month state of emergency in the Ouest, Artibonite, and Centre departments, underscoring how violence is no longer confined to the capital.
The two major gang coalitions in Port-au-Prince have merged to form the Viv Ansanm alliance, led by former police officer Jimmy Chérizier (alias Barbecue). This is part of a broader effort to consolidate power and destabilise the government.
According to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), between April and June 2025, 1,520 people were killed and 609 wounded; 628 cases of sexual violence were recorded. These figures indicate not only high levels of violence but also the systematic targeting of civilians. Attacks frequently include destroying homes and schools and disrupting education and community life. Civilian frustration with state inaction has begun to manifest in disruptive protests: on 17 June, residents of Mirebalais shut down the Péligre hydroelectric plant, which supplies about 30% of Haiti’s electricity.
Gangs are also adopting new technologies, notably unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In June, three Haitians believed to be Viv Ansanm members were stopped in the Dominican Republic while attempting to buy drones. Barbecue openly declared, “I have money. Drones are sold everywhere. I can also obtain them.” These UAVs could be used for smuggling, surveillance, or improvised attacks. Further cross-border militarisation is clearly possible.
The human impact of these dynamics is visible in the country’s displacement crisis. A June report published by the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) stated that Haiti has 1,287,593 internally displaced persons (IDPs), representing 11% of its national population.
Meanwhile, cross-border migration has become a prominent political issue within the Dominican Republic. President Luis Abinader’s 2024 re-election campaign emphasised measures to deter Haitian migration, and in April 2025, his government introduced 15 new policies targeting undocumented migrants. In the immediate to short term (four weeks to six months), Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic is expected to continue, but deportations are also likely to persist as the government leads a crackdown.
Children are among the most affected by the violence. In 2024, the UN verified 2,269 grave violations against 1,373 children, including 566 cases of sexual violence, 154 abductions, and 302 recruitments by armed groups. Compared with 2023, child recruitment rose by 70%, suggesting that gangs are increasingly targeting minors. These patterns will shape social dynamics with lasting consequences.
The scale of displacement and civilian harm also underscores the pressure on Haiti’s overstretched security institutions, which are struggling to contain gang violence despite new international backing.
Since early 2025, the Haitian Police has increasingly deployed UAVs, killing around 300 gang members and wounding 400. UAVs improve targeting and reduce risks to personnel, but civilian casualties in a 10 June operation underline the dangers.
The MSSM’s effectiveness has come under scrutiny: despite its deployment, gangs have expanded their reach. Uncertainty over personnel numbers, with the Kenyan president reporting 1,004 to the UNSC on 20 June and HRW citing 991 five days later, reflects broader issues of transparency and co-ordination, and highlights a shortfall from the initially promised 2,500 officers and soldiers. At the same time, funding gaps and delays in opening nine of the 12 planned operational bases have constrained the mission’s capacity to project security nationwide.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the overall security architecture remains fragile and uneven, leaving space for gangs to adapt and persist.
The CPT is tasked with organising elections and a constitutional referendum. General elections are scheduled for 15 November, although Janes assesses that free, fair, and secure polls remain unlikely. Preparations nevertheless continue with support from the MSSM and the UN. No date has been set for the referendum, which would establish a full presidential system and replace the two-round presidential election with the first-past-the-post system.
Elections are widely presented by both Haitian leaders and international partners as a route out of crisis, yet their feasibility and legitimacy remain in question. Voting under conditions of gang dominance may lead to intimidation, low turnout, and contested outcomes. Postponement could erode the CPT’s credibility, while rushing to meet the deadline risks deepening instability. For international actors, elections are treated as the benchmark for progress; yet if they fail or are discredited, Haiti could face a renewed political vacuum. Even if a president is elected in 2026, effective governance may remain elusive unless gangs are weakened and security conditions improve.
Janes assesses that Haiti’s security outlook for the immediate to medium term (four weeks to 12 months) is very likely to remain volatile as the MSSM’s mandate ends in October 2025. If the mandate is extended, significant improvement is not assured, as gangs have continued to expand despite its presence. If it withdraws, gangs are likely to consolidate control further, which could prolong the state of emergency.
Elections remain scheduled, but the current security context raises questions about whether they can be held in a credible and secure manner. At the time of publication, the country’s political parties are yet to select their presidential candidates.
Janes has high confidence that gangs are very likely to continue disrupting civilian life through killings, kidnappings, and sexual abuses. Furthermore, it is likely (55–80% chance) that gangs will adapt their tactics to acquire more UAVs, increasing their attacks on both security personnel and civilians. If elections do go ahead, it is likely that they will be impacted by violent incidents.
Haiti enters the coming year with overlapping political, security, and humanitarian challenges. The capacity of the CPT to organise credible elections, the effectiveness of the MSSM, and the adaptability of gangs will be key factors shaping outcomes. While external support continues, the persistence of violence and displacement suggests that progress is likely to be uneven, and the short to medium term will remain marked by uncertainty.
Elin Roberts is a Latin America analyst at Janes and was selected as a 2025 Rising Expert by the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. She has worked on Latin America at the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Transparencia por Colombia, and the Observatoire Politique de l’Amérique Latine et des Caraïbes (OPALC) at Sciences Po Paris. She also specialised in the region throughout her bachelor’s and master’s studies at Sciences Po, and founded the Latin America Watch at London Politica. Beyond her regional expertise, she has held positions at RANE, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), the Department for Business and Trade, and AXA. Her research interests include Latin America, security, technology, and trade policy.
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