Costa Rica’s Election: Latin America’s Steady Rightward Shift Welcomes Its Third Female Leader

Costa Rica has long been regarded as a democratic benchmark in Latin America, characterised by strong political institutions, a pluralistic and independent press, and comparatively high levels of education attainment. Following the 1948 civil conflict, former president José Figueres abolished the national army by public decree, establishing the world’s first demilitarised democracy and sharply distinguishing Costa Rica from the militarised trajectories of its regional neighbours.

Against this historical backdrop, a range of social pressures -most notably rising violence and growing visibility of organised crime-, emerged as salient issues in the presidential election held on 1 February 2026. Whereas unemployment and the cost of living dominated voter concerns four years ago, electoral priorities in 2026 shifted decisively toward citizen security. In this context, Laura Fernández Delgado, a 39 year-old political scientist and former presidential chief of staff to incumbent president Rodrigo Chaves, centred her campaign on tough-on-crime policies. These included proposals for stricter criminal sentencing and the adoption of a state of exception modelled after Nayib Bukele’s approach in El Salvador.

Running as the candidate of the governing Pueblo Soberano Party (PPSO), Fernández also pledged for policy continuity and has indicated that she intends to appoint outgoing President Chaves to a senior position in her cabinet. Laura Fernández secured a decisive first-round victory with 48.5 percent of the vote in a highly fragmented race featuring twenty candidates, comfortably surpassing the 40 percent threshold required to avoid a runoff. Her closest challenger, centre-right economist Alvaro Ramos of the National Liberation Party, obtained 33.4 percent of the vote, while no other candidate exceeded five percent. Of the approximately 3.7 million Costa Ricans eligible to vote, turnout reached nearly 70 per cent, one of the highest levels recorded in recent electoral cycles.

Despite being constitutionally barred from seeking re-election, incumbent President Rodrigo Chaves played a central role in consolidating electoral support for Fernández, whose campaign closely mirrored his policy agenda, particularly in its emphasis on more assertive approach to public security. In 2022, Chaves had campaigned as a political outsider, portraying traditional political parties as corrupt and self-serving, an appeal that resonated amid higher unemployment and fiscal imbalance. His administration reduced public debt from 68 to 55.9 per cent of GDP by 2025 and lowered unemployment from 14 to 6.6 per cent over the same period, alongside strong annual growth. Notwithstanding corruption investigations, rising rates of violence and broader socioeconomic challenges, Chaves maintained considerable popular support, underpinned by a carefully cultivated image of technocratic competence in fiscal management and confrontational stance toward entrenched political elites.

While Fernández electoral victory reflects broader realignment of voter priorities driven by growing concerns over crime and drug trafficking, Costa Rica remains better positioned than other Latin American countries to confront the growing threat posed by transnational organised crime and may display greater resilience in limiting the influence of the global cocaine trade. Moreover, Costa Rica is a fast-growing OECD economy, with real GDP projected to expand by 3.4 per cent in 2026 and 3.5 per cent in 2027, driven by robust service exports, tourism and medical devices manufacturing sector. A key challenge to the medium-term outlook, however, lies in the country’s heavy reliance on the US market and the potential imposition of tariffs by President Trump’s administration -particularly on medical equipment-, given the sector’s outsized contribution to export growth, foreign direct investment, and overall economic activity.

Costa Ricans also elected the 57 members of the National Assembly. During her campaign, Laura Fernández sought to secure a congressional supermajority that would enable judicial reforms and constitutional amendments. Her party ultimately won 31 seats in total, granting the president-elect a working legislative majority sufficient to implement some proposed reforms, but falling short of the qualified majority required to amend the Constitution or to convene a National Constituent Assembly to establish the so-called Third Republic. Consequently, despite the ruling party’s decisive electoral victory, the PPSO will need to forge agreements with opposition parties, which, although weakened, retain the capacity to block certain initiatives in Congress.

In May 2026, Laura Fernández will become only the second woman to assume the presidency of Costa Rica, following Laura Chinchilla’s tenure from 2010 to 2014. Her election also places her among the relatively small cohort of female heads of state in Latin America, alongside Claudia Sheinbaum in México and Delcy Rodríguez, who has recently assumed the acting presidency of Venezuela.

What remains uncertain is the degree of influence that outgoing President Rodrigo Chaves will exert under Fernández’s administration, as well as whether Costa Rica’s democratic institutions will sustain their historical resilience amid evolving internal and regional pressures. Further questions persist regarding the capacity of this traditionally stable democracy to address entrenched social challenges while navigating the political and institutional transformations implied by Fernández’s electoral mandate and legislative constraints.