How a Democratic Congress May Reshape the Trump Administration’s Toolkit in Latin America

The US midterm elections held on November 3rd dealt a blow to President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. The Democratic Party took control of the Congress with (at the time of writing) 255 out of 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 55 seats out of 100 in the Senate. Historically, the president’s party almost always loses seats during the midterms, but the scale of the defeat this year was unusually large. US foreign policy towards Latin America was not a major issue in the campaign, and the results are unlikely to cause a shift in US objectives in the region, but they may change the tools available to pursue them.

Around half of voters said that the cost of living was a crucial factor in their decision, according to the AP Voter Poll. The prices of fuel, food, cars, technology, and other household goods were already climbing in the wake of the Trump Administration’s sweeping global tariffs, and gasoline prices skyrocketed after the US attacked Iran in February 2026. Latin America has directly felt the tariffs, and Brazil has faced uniquely high tariffs up to 40%. The Trump Administration has also consistently undermined democratic norms and practices, and around one third of voters said democracy was the top issue facing the country. In contrast, US foreign policy in Latin America was barely discussed in the campaigns, aside from a few congressional races in South Florida where candidates debated US policy towards Cuba and the effectiveness of the raid on Venezuela’s former President Nicolás Maduro.

Across both Trump Administrations, US priorities in Latin America have been limiting China’s influence and curbing immigration, goals the President has increasingly pursued by force. The 2025 US National Security Strategy characterized this as a contemporary application of the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to preserve the hemisphere for US leadership and influence. The so-called ‘Donroe Doctrine’ has manifested in attempts to persuade (or coerce) Latin American countries to scale back relations with China, especially in strategic sectors like telecommunications or critical minerals. The Trump Administration has severely restricted immigration, increased deportations, and pressured Latin American countries to enforce US immigration policy at their own borders. It has also been highly interventionist in its approach to the region, conducting a series of airstrikes on alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean, revoking visas for Latin American officials who contradict US preferences, and most drastically, the overnight raid on Maduro.

The new Congress may seek to constrain the administration’s use of force to carry out its policies. Previous attempts in the House and Senate to pass war powers resolutions requiring the president to seek congressional approval for further strikes against boats in the Caribbean failed along party lines. A similar vote in the new Congress would likely pass. Democrats in Congress could also seek to pre-emptively prohibit a similar use of force for leadership change in Cuba as was used against Maduro in Venezuela. Beyond war powers, Congress could also leverage its control of the federal budget to shape foreign policy.

However, there are meaningful limits to this. Congress has struggled to constrain President Trump on foreign policy in the past two years. Despite its constitutional authority over trade, Congress has been unable to stop new tariffs, relying instead on the courts to strike down some justifications. At least eight attempts to curb US attacks on Iran failed to restrain the use of force, with only one resolution passing in the House. Additionally, Congress may have other priorities. In the hierarchy of foreign policy issues, Latin America ranks far behind Iran. It also ranks behind China, and there is a strong consensus even among Democrats that China’s influence in Latin America should be curtailed. Finally, Congress appears more likely to focus its attention first on investigations of Trump-appointed officials, potentially starting with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. These factors all point towards continuity for US foreign policy in Latin America.

One potential shakeup would be a resignation by Secretary of State Marco Rubio to consider a 2028 presidential bid. He has led much of the Latin America portfolio in the past two years and has consistently been a hardline voice on Cuba, Venezuela, and immigration, advocating for a much more interventionist approach to the region than other officials in the Trump Administration may prefer. His exit could shift policy, but his plans and any successor are still highly uncertain.

In the short term, the likely outcome is continuity. The bigger questions are now about what happens in two years. After the midterm dust settles, the 2028 presidential hopefuls will begin floating their foreign policy agendas. But again, Latin America is unlikely to dominate the race unless a major crisis emerges.

About the author

Zara C. Albright is a Lecturer in International Relations of the Americas at University College London. Her research examines how domestic politics influence the foreign policies of small states navigating great power competition, with an empirical focus on China-Latin America relations in the 21st Century. Her work has been published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs and Latin American Politics and Society, among others. She has previously held fellowships from the Princeton University Program in Latin American Studies, the O’Brien Notre Dame International Security Center, and the Boston University Global Development Policy Center. She completed her Ph.D. in Political Science at Boston University in 2025.

References

“The AP Voter Poll.” 2026. The Associated Press (AP). https://apnews.com/projects/elections-2026/voter-poll/

“Trump Tariff Tracker.” 2026. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/geoeconomics-center/trump-tariff-tracker/

National Security Strategy of the United States of America. November 2025.